Classics

Explore classic papers developing key ideas underlying Consensus Choice.

On the Robustness of Majority Rule

Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin show that simple majority rule uniquely satisfies a combination of desirable voting criteria—Pareto efficiency, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), and generic decisiveness—over a broader range of voter preferences than any other voting rule.

Condorcet Social Choice Functions

Condorcet-based methods, like Consensus Choice, pick the candidate who would win a one-on-one race against every other candidate, if such a candidate exists.

Condorcet’s Theory of Voting

H.P. Young explains and defends Condorcet’s theory that a candidate who wins in every head-to-head matchup (a "Condorcet winner") is the most likely to be the socially optimal choice, especially when voters aim to make correct judgments rather than simply express preferences.

Extending Condorcet’s Rule

H.P. Young explores how to fairly extend Condorcet’s principle—that a candidate who beats every other candidate head-to-head should win—to elections where no such clear winner exists due to cycles in preferences.

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Voting Theory