Voting Theory

Discover academic foundations of the fundamental fairness principles that make Consensus Choice a superior election system.

Strategy-Proofness, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Majority Rule

Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin show that among all possible voting methods, majority rule—as used in Consensus Choice—is uniquely able to satisfy a set of fundamental fairness principles, including strategy-proofness (resisting manipulation), anonymity, and independence from irrelevant alternatives, as long as majority preferences do not form cycles.

Characterizations of voting rules based on majority margins

Yifeng Ding, Wesley H. Holliday, and Eric Pacuit introduce and analyze a critical fairness principle called Preferential Equality, which ensures that if either of the two voters switch their rankings between two adjacent candidates, the impact on the election outcome should be the same regardless of which voter makes the switch. This principle guarantees that all voters' preferences are treated equally in head-to-head candidate comparisons, preventing distortions where some voters' changes have greater influence than others.

The Social Utility of Voting Revisited

Wesley H. Holliday and Eric Pacuit revisit foundational questions about how well various voting methods come to electing candidates who maximize the utility of voters, assuming sincere voting on the part of voters.

An extension of May’s Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting

Wesley H. Holliday and Eric Pacuit extend May's theorem, originally formulated for two-alternative elections, to elections involving three alternatives. May’s axioms include requirements such as neutrality (treating candidates equally), anonymity (treating voters equally), and positive responsiveness (candidates benefiting from rising in voter rankings).

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Versions of Consensus Choice

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Classics