Political Implications
Explore research on how election methods that produce a Consensus Choice can enhance democratic stability, reduce partisan polarization and extremism, promote compromise and increase accountability.
Tactical Voting in Three-Candidate Polar Elections under Instant Runoff and under Condorcet Methods
Charles T. Munger, Jr. investigates how resistant different voting systems are to tactical voting, which occurs when voters cast a ballot that does not reflect their sincere preferences.
Robust Electoral Competition: Rethinking Electoral Systems to Encourage Representative Outcomes
American democracy is suffering from declining electoral competition, with increasingly polarized candidates and unresponsive governance. Nathan Atkinson and Scott Ganz voters propose a form of Condorcet Voting that ensures that the candidate preferred in all head-to-head matchups wins, restoring robust competition, motivating moderation, and enabling third-party candidates with broad appeal to succeed when major parties drift too far from the center.
“The Real Preference of Voters”: Madison’s Idea of a Top-Three Election and The Present Necessity of Reform
Edward B. Foley shows that James Madison comprehended and embraced Condorcet’s insights on the mathematics of majority rule in a letter describing a Condorcet-based electoral system.
The Importance of Condorcet Consistency in Preserving Democracy
Robbie Robinette and Nicolaus Tideman suggest that a good voting rule rewards candidates for finding compromises among the desires of their electorates rather than for placing their party (or faction) ahead of their country.
Electoral Reform in the United States: Proposals for Combating Polarization and Extremism
In Chapter 2, Edward B. Foley shows that the system of partisan primaries followed by plurality-winner general elections used widely in the United States is especially susceptible to overrepresentation of partisan extremism when the electorate itself is highly polarized and voters are relatively far from the electorate’s median.
Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked Choice Voting Solve the Problem of Political Polarization?
Nathan Atkinson, Edward B. Foley and Scott Ganz provide empirical evidence to show that Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) tends to produce winning candidates who are more divergent ideologically from their state’s median voter than other forms of ranked choice voting, like Consensus Choice Voting. The effect is most pronounced in the most polarized states—precisely the electorates for which IRV is being promoted as an antidote to existing divisiveness.