Versions
Explore versions of Consensus Choice that promote fairness and transparency and produce candidates who are accountable to all voters, not just their partisan base.
An extension of May’s Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting
Here we show that by adding some desirable axioms to May’s axioms, we can uniquely determine how to vote on three alternatives (setting aside tiebreaking).
Axiomatizations of a simple Condorcet voting method for Final Four and Final Five elections
Building on previous work, Wesley H. Holliday introduces a simple voting method for Final Four elections and extends it to Final Five elections. Most Wins, Smallest Loss (MWSL) is a Condorcet-consistent voting method defined as follows:
Determine the number of head-to-head wins for each candidate.
The candidate with the most wins is elected.
If multiple candidates tie for the most wins, then elect the one with the smallest head-to-head loss.
A simple Condorcet voting method for Final Four elections
Wesley H. Holliday introduces a simple form of Consensus Choice specifically designed for elections involving up to four candidates ("Final Four elections"). In this method, voters rank candidates in order of preference. If one candidate wins all head-to-head matchups against the others, that candidate wins outright. If no candidate achieves this, the candidate who loses only one matchup by the smallest margin of votes wins.