Classics
On the Robustness of Majority Rule
Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin show that simple majority rule uniquely satisfies a combination of desirable voting criteria—Pareto efficiency, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), and generic decisiveness—over a broader range of voter preferences than any other voting rule. Through formal mathematical modeling, Dasgupta and Maskin show that majority rule performs robustly under various restricted preference domains (such as single-peaked preferences), unlike systems like plurality or the Borda count that fail certain fairness conditions like IIA. Consensus Choice Voting (a Condorcet method) builds on majority rule in head-to-head matchups.
Condorcet’s Theory of Voting
H.P. Young explains and defends Condorcet’s theory that a candidate who wins in every head-to-head matchup (a "Condorcet winner") is the most likely to be the socially optimal choice, especially when voters aim to make correct judgments rather than simply express preferences. The article shows how Condorcet’s method statistically aggregates preferences, ensures local stability (meaning new or irrelevant candidates don’t alter the outcome), and resists strategic manipulation better than other methods like Borda or Instant Runoff. These findings support Consensus Choice Voting as a system rooted in fairness, equal treatment of voters, and resilience against spoilers or vote distortion, offering a principled way to elect broadly supported leaders in a deeply divided political landscape.
Condorcet Social Choice Functions
Condorcet-based methods, like Consensus Choice Voting, pick the candidate who would win a one-on-one race against every other candidate, if such a candidate exists. When there’s no clear winner—because voter preferences create a majority cycle—there are several smart ways to break the tie fairly. Peter C. Fishburn’s research examines nine different versions of Condorcet voting and compares how well each one meets important goals like fairness, voter equality, and consistency.
Extending Condorcet’s Rule
H.P. Young explores how to fairly extend Condorcet’s principle—that a candidate who beats every other candidate head-to-head should win—to elections where no such clear winner exists due to cycles in preferences. Young analyzes how social choice functions (rules for choosing winners) can be designed to honor the spirit of majority rule while still delivering a fair and consistent result when no Condorcet winner exists. Young's research provides a foundation for a version of Consensus Choice Voting, showing that it is not only grounded in democratic majority principles but also thoughtfully addresses complex scenarios where voters are split—ensuring outcomes that reflect voter equality and fair representation.