Political Implications
Electoral Reform in the United States: Proposals for Combating Polarization and Extremism
In Chapter 2, Edward B. Foley shows that the system of partisan primaries followed by plurality-winner general elections used widely in the United States is especially susceptible to overrepresentation of partisan extremism when the electorate itself is highly polarized and voters are relatively far from the electorate’s median. The kind of system adopted in Alaska can help considerably to counteract the election of extreme candidates. However, as polarization of the electorate intensifies, the ability of Instant Runoff Voting to avoid the election of extremists is reduced dramatically. Foley shows that the only effective method of substantial depolarization is to adopt some form of most-preferred voting, which includes Consensus Choice Voting.
The Importance of Condorcet Consistency in Preserving Democracy
Robbie Robinette and Nicolaus Tideman suggest that a good voting rule rewards candidates for finding compromises among the desires of their electorates rather than for placing their party (or faction) ahead of their country. Instant Runoff Voting often yields results with the same problems as those that occur under plurality with a partisan primary, because voters choose candidates who support their factions. On the other hand, Consensus Choice Voting leads candidates to centrist strategies, by rewarding candidates who propose compromises.
“The Real Preference of Voters”: Madison’s Idea of a Top-Three Election and The Present Necessity of Reform
Edward B. Foley shows that James Madison comprehended and embraced Condorcet’s insights on the mathematics of majority rule in a letter describing a Condorcet-based electoral system. If adopted, elections would put into effect what Madison himself termed “the real preference of the Voters.” Foley asserts that such a system would protect Madisonian democracy from the threat of an authoritarian demagogue who is able to prevail currently by first winning a partisan primary and then being more popular than the opposing party’s nominee.
The Fairest Vote of All
In this article published by Scientific American, Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin show that while there is no such thing as a perfect voting system, a system like Consensus Choice Voting permits a more accurate representation of voters’ view. Consensus Choice Voting more often avoids the flaws that arise for other voting methods and, significantly, could be easily implemented in the United States and in countries around the world. Read more by Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen in The Rules of the Game: A New Electoral System published by The New York Review of Books.
Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked Choice Voting Solve the Problem of Political Polarization?
Nathan Atkinson, Edward B. Foley and Scott Ganz provide empirical evidence to show that Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) tends to produce winning candidates who are more divergent ideologically from their state’s median voter than other forms of ranked choice voting, like Consensus Choice Voting. The effect is most pronounced in the most polarized states—precisely the electorates for which IRV is being promoted as an antidote to existing divisiveness. Through simulations, they show that a Condorcet electoral method will tend to elect candidates much closer to the state’s median and mean voter, especially for highly polarized states with bimodal electorates, like Arizona, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania.
The Constitution and Condorcet: Democracy Protection through Electoral Reform
Edward B. Foley argues that the U.S. Constitution’s electoral framework must evolve to better defend democracy against authoritarian threats, and he proposes incorporating Condorcet-based voting systems, like Consensus Choice Voting, to do so. He shows that traditional plurality and even Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) can allow authoritarian populists to win despite lacking majority support, while systems like Consensus Choice Voting better reflect the will of majorities and are more resistant to manipulation. As a result, Consensus Choice Voting has potential to uphold democratic legitimacy by ensuring leaders are broadly preferred and truly accountable to majorities of voters.
Robust Electoral Competition: Rethinking Electoral Systems to Encourage Representative Outcomes
American democracy is suffering from declining electoral competition, with increasingly polarized candidates and unresponsive governance. Using both theoretical modeling and empirical data, Nathan Atkinson and Scott Ganz show that Instant Runoff Voting (IRV)—despite its popularity—fails to address the core issue: a lack of strong incentives for candidates to appeal to the majority of voters. Instead, they propose a form of Condorcet Voting, like Consensus Choice Voting, which ensures that the candidate preferred in all head-to-head matchups wins, restoring robust competition, motivating moderation, and enabling third-party candidates with broad appeal to succeed when major parties drift too far from the center.